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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In several particulars the respondents' statement of facts
is in error and is misstated.

These misstatements will be referred

to in particular under the appropriate points that follow.
For clarification, appellant will be referred to as PCA
(Utah Farm Production Credit Association), and respondents as
borrowers.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF FAILS TO SHOW THAT THEY MITIGATED DAMAGES
AS REQUIRED BY LAW
Both parties agree that, under the law, lost profits are
not recoverable by the borrowers unless they were unable to obtain
a loan elsewhere. This is because lost profits represent special
damages and only general damages (the increased interest expense)
are recoverable when an alternate loan is available.

This is

because there are no special damages when an alternate loan is
obtained.
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The borrowers failed to show that they were unable to
obtain a loan elsewhere. It is undisputed that alternate financing
was available from other sources including the Moroni Feed Company.
(Transcript 106, 121, 136 - 138)

The borrowers testified that they '

absolutely could have obtained financing for 1977 from the Moroni
Feed Company. (Transcript 136)
One of the borrowers' own witnesses testified that there
are other sources of financing besides PCA and that some growers

~

are financed through a finance company such as a bank or a lending
company. (Transcript 186)

The borrowers borrowed some money for

their turkey operation from the Bank of Ephraim in 1977.
(Transcript 101 - 102) The party who purchased the turkeys from the
borrowers found financing through the 70-30 Program. (Transcript
106 - 107)

In 1976 the borrowers got financing from the Moroni

Feed Company. (Transcript 64 - 65)

So alternate financing was

available.
Borrowers would excuse the fact that they did not even
attempt to get available alternate financing because they had a
prior delinquency with PCA and PCA had threatened to foreclose.
That is no excuse because (1) it was entirely the borrowers' fault,
rather than PCA, that the borrowers were delinquent and in that
position, and they should not be allowed to benefit from their own
wrong, and (2) the borrowers could have obtained a loan to finance
current operations and to refinance the delinquency, thereby
preventing any possibility of a foreclosure.

At least they had a

duty to make a reasonable attempt to get such financing.
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But they

1

1

-3made such loans in the past for current operations and past
delinquency. (Transcript 137)
So, the borrowers' conclusion that prospects were poor for
obtaining a loan is not supported by the record. In actuality, the
record is to the contrary.

The testimony was that Moroni Feed

Company had made loans in the past for current operations and past
delinquencies, but that the borrowers made no application in this
case and, therefore, do not know whether such a loan was available.
(Transcript 137)

Having failed to even make application for the

necessary loan, the borrowers are precluded as a matter of law from
being awarded any damages for lost profits.

This is because there

would have been no lost profits if the borrowers had taken
advantage of available alternate financing.
The borrowers knew any foreclosure action could be
prevented through refinancing with another lender.

They also knew

that even if refinancing proved unavailable that any foreclosure
could not be completed during the growing year with the borrowers'
rights of redemption and other rights. When the threat of
foreclosure was made, the response of the borrowers was that they
would bring suit to prevent the foreclosure. (Transcript 105)

So

borrowers' excuse for not even attempting to get alternate
financing (imminent foreclosure) is only an excuse.
The borrowers had plenty of time to obtain alternate
financing.

Even if that had failed, all the borrowers had to do to

get the loan from PCA

was pledge the stock of Elliott Cox, one of

the responents, in the Moroni Coal Company. (Transcript 102 - 103)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-4Even if not obligated contractually to do so, that was their duty
under the doctrine of mitigation.

It was a duty that created no

burden because Elliott Cox was already personally liable on the
note and thus his stock was already indirectly pledged. (Transcript
288) Consequently, it would have been reasonable for the borrowers

to have mitigated damages by pledging the stock. Having failed to
mitigate in this regard and more particularly in regard to
obtaining alternate financing, the damages must be denied as a
matter of law.
The borrowers claim to have mitigated damages by selling
the 20,000 turkeys and canceling the order for 40,000 and not
incurring further expense. However, PCA did not get credit for that
claimed mitigation nor for the 20 cents per poult that borrowers
received when they sold the poults. Furthermore, the law states what
mitigation is required in the case of loan commitments and the
mitigation must take the form of an attempt to get an alternate
loan.

Cox Corp. v. Duggar, 583 P. 2d 19 6 (Utah 197 8) • Therefore, the

borrowers failed to mitigate as required by law.
Borrowers' brief does not even attempt to counter the
argument by PCA that the work by one of the borrowers at Moroni Coal
Company, after financing with PCA failed, resulted in profits to
that company and the borrowers because they owned at least 47% of
that company.
163)

PCA

was not credited with that benefit.

(Transcript

Consequently, the borrowers are getting a benefit which they

would not have received if they had remained in the turkey business
because Jeff Cox, one of the borrowers, would have been running the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-5Company.

PCA was not credited with that benefit.
Even the limited credit that PCA was given was inaccurately

calculated.

Cox testified that he went to work for the Moroni Coal

Company in the beginning of April, 1977, for the sum of $200.00 per
week (in addition to the profit to the borrowers' stock in Moroni
Coal Company as a result of his work). (Transcript 139, 141)
Accordingly, the trial court gave PCA credit for $7200.00
representing 36 weeks at $200.00 per week.
Borrowers claim that the calculation was correct because
the first of April was a Friday and, therefore, Cox went to work at
the coal company on Monday, April 4.

Borrowers claim that this

meant that he worked 36 weeks plus 3 days if holidays were not considered.

That is incorrect.

There was nothing in the record to

show that Cox did not get $200.00 in a week where there was a
I

holiday.

4.

Furthermore, there were 13 weeks prior to Monday, April

This leaves 39 weeks for the rest of the year.

week, for 39 weeks ($200 x 39

= $8,000.00),

At $200.00 per

the credit should have

I

~

been $8,000.00, rather than $7200.00 representing an $800.00 error.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF FAILS TO SHOW ANY CONDUCT ON THE PART
OF THE APPELLANT CREATING APPARENT AUTHORITY IN THE LOAN OFFICER
Both the parties agree that the loan officer did not have

I

express or implied authority to make a loan commitment.

The loan

I

was never approved by the loan committee as required. The borrowers

j

~laim that PCA's loan officer had apparent authority. The theory of

the borrowers is that PCA failed to act where there was a duty to
~ct,

such that it led the borrowers to believe that the agent had
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~uthority

to make the loan commitment.

-6Borrowers fail to show what the inaction was or that there
was a duty.

Borrowers reference to the record to support the

conclusion that the loan officer had authority is Finding of Fact
18, which is nothing more than a conclusory statement that the
agent had authority.

There is nothing in the record to support

that finding.
The only suggestion by the borrowers of PCA's failure to
act when it had a duty to act was that (1) the borrowers were not
aware that the loan officer had no authority and thought his
commitment was final, (2) borrowers past experience was that the
loan officer approved the loan, and (3) PCA was aware of its
agent's practices of committing loans before final approval and
never informed the borrowers that such approvals were not binding.
In response to number (1), just because the borrowers
mistakingly concluded that the loan officer had authority does not
mean that he had authority or that PCA had a duty to inform the
borrowers of their mistaken conclusion.

There is nothing in the

record to show that PCA knew that the borrowers were acting under
erroneous information.

In fact, the record is to the contrary.

Borrowers knew that loan committee approval was required.
(Transcript 118 -119)
The same is true in response to (2).

The borrowers just

assumed that it was the loan officer himself who had approved loans
in the past.

Such was not the case.

The loan officer was merely

telling the borrowers what the loan committee had done. Again, the
borrowers had mistakingly concluded something but they failed to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-7show that PCA caused their mistaken conclusion and thereby had a
duty to correct it for them.
The only reason for the borrowers' conclusion was that in
the past when the loan officer made his commitment, the borrowers
eventually got the loan.

That was only because it had been

previously approved by the loan committee.
Actually, it is apparent that the borrowers knew that

. loan committee approval was required because their testimony was
that in the past the loan officer had told them that the loan

, committee had already approved the loan. (Transcript 118)

Later on

i

they testified that they had been told that a prior loan had been
approved by the loan committee. (Transcript 119)
~

So borrowers did

not really believe that the loan officer had authority to approve
the loan.
The borrowers said that in prior loans that when the loan

I

officer had told them that something would be done, it was always
done and that the loan officer's commitment was good enough for
~

them. (Transcript 119)

That did not mean that it did not require

~

loan committee approval or that they did not know of such. The
borrowers admitted that they did not know whether the loan officer
actually had authority.

(Transcript 119 -120)

In response to (3), the borrowers cite the transcript at

-pages

252, 308 and 322 in support of the conclusion that PCA was

-aware of the loan officer's practices of committing loans before
~

~

final approval.

Page 252 does not say that.

It says that loan

committee approval was necessary and that there may have been cases
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8where the loan officer took it upon himself to do certain things,
but they were not complying with company policy. The witness did
not say what those certain things were and he only said that may
have been the case.

He did not say that PCA knew of any such

practice, assuming such was the practice.

Nor did he say that

these borrowers had been mislead by any such practice.

In fact,

the borrowers own witness testified that the borrowers were not
told of approval until the loan committee had approved a loan.
(Transcript 320)
Page 308 only says that loans are committed before all the ·
paper work was done.

It does not say that loan officers were

committing loans to borrowers before the loan committees' approval.
A loan can be given final approval by the loan committee before all
the paper work is done.

(Transcript 250, 285)

Even if a loan officer was giving a commitment before loan
committee approval, there is nothing in the record to indicate that
these borrowers were misled.

In the instance referred to,

involving a different party, that party may have been misinformed,
but that had no bearing on the respondents. Even in that unrelated
instance, the application had been taken to the loan committee
before a commitment was given and the loan officer knew that the
loan committee had verbally approved the loan, even though all the
paper work had not been completed.

(Transcript 310)

In that case

the loan officer thought that the loan committee had signed the
papers before telling the borrower of approval. (Transcript 311,
312)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-9Page 322 only says that some growers were allowed to take
delivery of their poults while the loan application was pending. It
says nothing in support of the conclusion that PCA was aware of an
agent's practice of committing loans before final approval.

So

there was no inaction by PCA where there was a duty to act and
consequently no apparent authority.
The law requires that PCA, rather than the loan officer,
give the borrowers the mistaken impression they had. Malia v.
Giles, 114 P.2d 208; (Utah 1941);

Bank of Salt Lake v.

Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints, 534 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975).

The borrowers did not show any

, way in which PCA created any such situation, thereby giving a duty
to correct the borrowers' mistaken conclusion.

Furthermore, it

does not appear from the record that the borrowers were honestly
mistaken.

They knew loan committee approval was required.

(Transcript 118-119)
The other authority of law cited by the borrowers in
support of their conclusion that the loan officer had apparent

i

authority is the Restatement of Agency to the effect that third
persons who are aware of what a continuously employed agent has
done, are normally entitled to believe that he will continue to
have such authority until the third person has been notified that

&

~

the agent is no longer authorized.

In the case at bar, the

borrowers did not even believe that the loan officer could make a
commitment without loan committee approval. (Transcript 118 - 119)

'Consequently, the borrowers could not have believed that the loan
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-10officer would continue to have authority that they never believed
he had. Nor could authority continue that the officer never
actually had.
THE RESPONDENTS' BRIEF FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE AGREEMENT
IS NOT VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The trial court made no finding as to the time within
which the loan was to be repaid.

The borrowers claim that it was

not necessarily more than a year because of some generalizations
made by their witness at the trial that it was to be paid
approximately a year after the note would have been executed
because it had been done that way in the past.
testimony leaves it within the Statute.

Even the borrowers'

That testimony was that

the note would have been written from January 1 to January 1.
(Transcript 128)

That is a contract that by its terms would not be

performed within one year.

January 1 to January 1 is more than one

year by one day and hence within the Statute of Frauds.
In reality the loans had never been paid one year after
the note was executed.

They had always matured on the sixth day of

the next month after the anniversary of the note. The only party
that really knew when repayment would have been required testified
that if the loan was committed in January of 1977, which the
borrowers claim it was, then it would have been due by its terms on
February 6, 1978. (Transcript 122-3, 127,130, 270-271A)
Actually the evidence was that there were to be two loans.
These included the one just referred to and another loan for seven
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-11years payable in seven installments. (Transcript 129 - 130, 234,
240, 249)

The second loan was to refinance the past delinquency

and the other loan was for 1977 operating expenses. There was more
than a dicussion about the seven year loan.
past delinquency was going to be refinanced.
249)

It was the way the
(Transcript 129-130,

So both the alleged commitments are void under the Statute.
Even if only one of the loans is unenforceable under the

Statute of Frauds, that would defeat borrowers' entire case because
they needed both loans.
Borrowers claim that if an oral contract that is otherwise within the Statute of Frauds can be performed within one year,

1

.that takes the contract out of the Statute of Frauds.
authorities cited by the borrowers are not on point.

1

The
They do not

involve cases where the terms of the contract provide for payment

.in excess of one year. Where the terms of the contract provide for
payment over a period that exceeds one year, then it must be in

!

writing. The Statute says:
"In the following cases every agreement shall be
void unless such agreement, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by
the party to be charged therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to
be performed within one year from the making
thereof." (Emphasis added)

!In the case at bar, the terms of the verbal contract provided for
payment to be made more than one year after the loan.

That was

dtrue of both loans.
Promissory Estoppel does not take the case out of the
Statute ofSponsored
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fact as required under the case of Ravarino v. Price cited by the
borrowers.

If there was a promise, it was to make a loan in the

future and therefore the doctrine of promissory estoppel is
inapplicable under the law of that case.
RESPONDENTS BRIEF FAILS TO SHOW THAT THEY DID PROVE DAMAGES WITH
REASONABLE CERTAINTY
Respondents Failed to Show That it Was Reasonably Certain That
They Could Have Acquired the Last 40,000 Poults
It is not reasonably certain that the borrowers could have
acquired the last 40,000 poults.

Just because PCA figured the

budget on the assumption that the poults could be delivered does
not mean that it was proven with reasonable certainty that the
poults would have been delivered as claimed by borrowers.
Borrowers misstate the evidence on page 12 of their brief
when they say that the hatchery manager stated that the 40,000
poults would have been delivered.

The answer was that they

"probably" could have been delivered. (Transcript 176)
requires more than probability.

The law

It requires reasonable certainty

and the answer of probability is insufficient to meet their burden
of proof.

The manager testified that respondents would have been a

second priority customer because they were not paying cash and,
therefore, whether the poults would have been available would have
been at the option of the Board of Directors.

(Transcript 177)

Therefore, it was not reasonably certain as required by law.
Borrowers said that no evidence was introduced to the
effect that the seller would not have been able to deliver the
poults.
The borrowers seek to shift the burdAn nP nrnnP hv m~~tng
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-13such a statement.

It was the borrowers' burden to prove that they

could have acquired the 40,000 poults from which to make a profit.
They failed to show reasonable certainty as required by law.

This

error, in and of itself, reduces the lost profit award by twothirds since 40,000 poults represents two-thirds of the turkeys.
Respondents Failed to Sustain Their Burden in Proving That
a Dividend From the Moroni Feed Company Was Not Speculative
Borrowers say that the testimony at trial made it clear
that the receipt of the retains was not speculative, citing pages
88-90 of the transcript.

That portion of the transcript does not

support the borrowers' conclusion.

It merely says that the

borrowers had a buyer for the retains.

That does not mean that it

is reasonably certain that the Moroni Feed Company will be able to
pay the dividend in 1982.
Borrowers say that the dividend will be paid in 1982
because the feed company is on firm financial standing.

There is

; nothing in the transcript to support that conclusion.
Borrowers say that no evidence was introduced that Moroni

tFeed Company had ever failed to pay the retains in the past. Again
~:
1

the borrowers seek to shift the burden of proof by making such a
statement. It was the borrowers' burden to prove with reasonable

• certainty that the feed company will be able to pay the dividend
in 1982. Again, they failed.
to $28,940.40.

That error, in and of itself, amounts

(Transcript 330)
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-14Respondents Fail to Show That They Proved They Were Average
Turkey Growers
·
There is absolutely nothing in the record to support the
claim by the borrowers that they proved that they were average and
that, therefore, their damage would have been the same as an
average grower.

The only testimony at trial was not what the

borrowers would have earned if given the loan, but what the average
grower would have earned. In fact, at the trial the Court sustained
appellants' objection as to what these particular borrowers would
have earned in 1977. The witness was only allowed to testify as to
what the average grower earned and not as to these borrowers
because there was no link in the evidence that they were average.
(Transcript 200)
The fact that borrowers were in the business for eleven
years does not mean that they were average. The fact that there may
have been some profits in some prior years does not mean that they
were average. The average grower may have made much greater profits
of these borrowers, assuming there were any. Furthermore, the
borrowers testified that they really did not know what profits
there were. (Transcript 152 - 153)
Again the borrowers seek to shift the burden of proof by
saying that there was no evidence that borrowers lost money during
any year that another grower made money.
burden to prove that they were average.

It was the borrowers'
They failed to do so.

only evidence in the record was the tax returns which showed
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The

~

-15nothing but losses.

(Exhibits 31-34 and Transcript 158, 166-167).

The borrowers claim they were at least average because
they grew heavier turkeys than average.

That proves nothing

because it costs more to grow heavier turkeys.

The borrowers were

not awarded damages for heavier turkeys because they failed to
prove the extra cost.

(Transcript 204, 209)

Without knowing the

extra costs that would be spent by the borrowers, compared to the
extra cost for the average grower, it cannot be determined if the
borrowers were average.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF FAILS TO SHOW THAT THEY HAD A BUSINESS HISTORY THAT
WOULD JUSTIFY DAMAGES
Borrowers say that there was no evidence as to what amount
of money the turkey operation lost during previous years and,
therefore, the business history does not preclude an award of
damages.

That conclusion is erroneous.

The issue is not how much

'was lost, but whether there had been losses and whether there was a

t

history of successful operation.

Since there was no evidence of

successful business operation, the damages must be denied. That was
their burden.

The only evidence was the testimony and tax returns

of the borrowers which show only losses. (Exhibits 31-34,
: Transcript 158, 166-167)

r;

The record at page 219 and 322, does not support the
conclusion of the borrowers that if they had done poorly during the
previous four years it was because the industry did poorly.
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-16Again borrowers seek to shift the burden of proof by
stating that there is no evidence that other growers made a profit
during those years. It is not PCA's burden to show that other
growers made a profit and only borrowers had a loss, nor is it
PCA's burden to offer evidence to indicate that the borrowers'
operation would not have realized the profits found by the Court as
suggested by the borrowers in their brief.
not the issue.
history.

Furthermore, that is

The law requires proof of successful business

The borrowers have failed to show a successful business

history because such was not the case, and their damages must also
fail.
ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE ALLOWED FOR THE APPEAL
Even if the case is not reversed, appellant is entitled to
$10,998.50 in attorney's fees.

If the case is reversed, the fee

should be $15,000.00, plus an additonal $5,000.00 for the appeal.
CONCLUSION
It would be unjust to allow the $44,927.60 counterclaim to
be affirmed.

That award reduced the amount which PCA was repaid on

a loan made to the borrowers and, therefore, it represents a loss
of real money actually delivered to the borrowers in connection
with a previous loan.
It is necessary to examine what both parties did or failed
to do that entitles the borrowers to save $44,927.60. All PCA did
was make a promise to loan money.

(PCA denies that any such
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-17promise was made, but that finding is not challenged on appeal
because there is the testimony of the borrowers claiming a verbal
loan commitment).

That is all PCA did to lose $44,927.60.

All the

'borrowers did to receive $44,927.60, was to implicity agree to
repay the loan. (Actually there was nothing in the record to show
tthat they ever promised to repay it, but apparently the Court has
:assumed such).

They did nothing else.

Once the promise was made to loan the money and to repay
~it,

the borrowers, after not receiving the loan, engaged in other

ibusiness ventures including the Moroni Coal Company.

That company

was owned by the borrowers, at least to the extent of forty-seven
percent (47%).

One of the borrowers, Jeff Cox, went to work full

time for the coal company after the loan failed, and he testified
~

that his return was likely to have been the cause for a significant
~

increase in profits from the prior year.

If there had been a loan,

l

it

he would not have been able to work for the coal company.
borrowers are getting the best of both worlds.

~other

~

They are allowed to

liquidate their turkey business without crediting PCA and they are

~awarded

1

So the

$44,927.60 for doing nothing and they are allowed to pursue

ventures and are not required to give PCA credit for profit

in that enterprise.

Such a result is totally inequitable and

contrary to the law of mitigation.
For the borrowers to be entitled to the $44,927.60, they

rmust have made a reasonable attempt to get alternate financing.
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-18Other financing was available.

Since the borrowers failed to even

attempt to get other financing, they failed to mitigate damages and
the award of the trial court must be reversed.

The fact that PCA

may have initiated foreclosure proceedings is no excuse because the
borrowers had a duty to make a reasonable attempt to get financing
that would have prevented the foreclosure. This had been done in
the past and there is nothing in the record to show that it could
not have been done this time.
It is apparent that the borrowers did not want to stay in
the turkey business enough to pledge the stock of one of the
borrowers even though that borrower was already personally
obligated on the note.
profits that year.

This shows their confidence in making

That is another way in which damages could have

and should have been mitigated.
Not only is PCA being charged $44,927.60 for simply making
a promise to loan money, but said promise was by an agent without
authority.

There is no dispute that the loan application exceeded

the agent's authority.
or implied authority.

Both parties agree that he had no express
There is nothing in the record to justify

any conclusion that he had apparent authority because the borrowers
knew that loan committee approval was required and because there is
nothing in the record to show that PCA caused the borrowers to
believe that the agent had authority.
To prevent problems presented when opposing parties claim
·opposite facts, such as whether a loan commitment was made
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'

the law

.~:

-19has created a policy in the form of the Statute of Frauds to
prevent one party from binding another unless the commitment was in
writing.

Under the Statute of this state, the promise to make a

loan had to be in writing because neither of the loans would have
been payable under their terms within one year.

Without any

question, one of the loans would have been payable in seven years.
Without that portion of the loan, the borrowers could not have
remained in business. The award of $44,927.60 should be reversed
because it was based on the alleged promise of an unauthorized
agent and there is no evidence in writing to show that the promise
was actually made.
Even if a promise had been made by an authorized agent in
writing, it is not reasonably certain, as required by law, that
these borrowers would have been able to net a profit of $44,927.60
or any amount.

This is because:

~

1.

It was only probable and not reasonably certain that

~

the borrowers could have even acquired the last 40,000 poults from

-which to make two-thirds

(2/3) of the profit.

~

2.

It is not reasonably certain that Moroni Feed Company

ii:

~ will be financially able to pay a dividend in 1982 which represents

~

~

$28,940.48 of the $44,927.60.

3.

It is not reasonably certain that these particular

borrowers would have made the same profit as other borrowers if
they had received the loan.

-transcript

There is absolutely nothing in the

to support the inference made by the trial court that
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because the average borrower made a certain net profit, these
borrowers would have made the same profit.
To prevent awards of lost profits that would be
inequitable, in situations similar to this case, the law has
another policy against awarding them where the -claimant fails to
show a prior business history of success.

Since the prior business

history of these borrowers showed nothing but losses, it would only
be fair to deny the award in this case and such a reversal would be
in conformity with law.
The ruling of the trial court must be reversed as to the
counterclaim and PCA should, as a matter of law, be awarded
$5,000.00 in attorney's fees for this appeal, together with
attorney's fees at the trial level as requested.
Respectfully submitted,

'
L)a.oU:L

3. t~~

David B. Boyce

)
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Earl Jay Peck
Attorney at Law
410 Newhouse Building
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